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REFUGEES AND THE PRIMACY OF
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Maryellen Fullerton*

ABSTRACT

More than one million asylum seekers and refugees made their way to
Europe in 2015. They came from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and many other
conflict zones.
When they entered the European Union (EU), they
encountered the Common European Asylum System. This EU legislation
contains a broadguarantee of refuge for those fleeing persecution, and for
those fleeing indiscriminate violence from armed conflict. However, one
legislativeprovision,known as the Dublin Regulation, generallyrequires that
asylum applications be evaluated by the first EU state an asylum seeker
enters. Pursuant to the Dublin Regulation, wealthier EU states such as
Germany and Austria have transferredmany asylum seekers back to Greece
and Italy, putting increasedpressure on the under-resourcedasylum systems
in these and other states that form the southern frontier of the EU The
promise ofprotection enshrinedin the EU asylum laws has been undercut by
the Dublin Regulation, and by the dysfunctional implementation of the asylum
system in poorerEU states.
In this setting, the European Convention of Human Rights, which does
not provide a right to asylum, has emerged as a bulwark of protection for
asylum seekers in Europe. All twenty-eight EU states are parties to the
European Human Rights Convention, and they are bound by its prohibition
against sending individuals to countries where they will face inhumane or
degradingtreatment. The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted
this provision to forbid EU states from relying on the Dublin Regulation to
return asylum seekers to Greece and to Italy, when their asylum systems are
in such disarraythat it is likely the asylum seekers will be treatedinhumanely
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or in a degradingmanner when they arrive. These rulings by the European
Human Rights Court have provided an importantjudicial check on EU law
and policy. Under the Court's jurisprudence,it is European human rights
law, rather than European asylum law, that has more resolutely protected
refugees.
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................
I. MASS DISPLACEMENT AND THE REFUGE CRISIS IN EUROPE IN
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INTRODUCTION

Ethnic violence, armed conflict, civil war, and persecution stalked the
globe in 2015. These horsemen of the apocalypse drove 65 million people
from their homes onto the refugee trail, marking 2015 as a year of
unprecedented forced displacement.' Refugees sought safety in virtually
every part of the globe. In each country of refuge, they faced dislocation,
trauma, and loss of control as well as unfamiliar social, political, and legal
landscapes.
Headlines, images, and video footage in the media portrayed the
desperation of the one million refugees who made their way to Europe in 2015.
The picture, however, was complex: the media captured both the hostility of
law enforcement officials stationed at borders and the hospitality of ordinary
European citizens. 2 Focusing on the current situation faced by refugees
I UNHCR,

2015 (2016) [hereinafter UNHCR,
2015], http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/country/576408cd7/unhcr-globaltrends-2015.html [https://perma.cc/Z6CF-D3BT] (unprecedented 65.3 million individuals
forcibly displaced; 5.8 million more than in prior year).
2 Photograph of Hungarian tripping a refugee, in Ivo Oliveira, Hungary's kicking
camerawoman
to
sue
refugee,
Facebook,
POLITICO
(Oct.
21,
2015), http://www.politico.eu/article/kicking-hungarian-camerawoman-sues-refugeefacebook/ [https://perma.cc/HJ2Q-4SNC]; Video of Hungarian border guards beating back
refugees, in European migrantsfind no welcome in Hungary (CNN online broadcast Aug. 27,
2015), htti://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2015/08/27/migrants-hungarv-btlkans-damonGLOBAL

GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN

TRENDS
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coming to Europe, this commentary explores the European legal framework
in place to protect refugees and asylum seekers, and in particular its unique
3
double judicial check feature.
Part I examines the events that led up to the refugee crisis and summarizes
the current situation in Europe. Part I describes and distinguishes the basic
features of European Union (EU) asylum law and European human rights law.
Part I analyzes how EU asylum law has responded to the mass influx of
refugees and individuals seeking asylum. Part IV discusses the active role the
European Court of Human Rights has played in addressing the problems
related to the refugee crisis. This commentary argues that the European Court
of Human Rights has become the primary guarantor of refugee rights in
Europe, overriding and overshadowing the European Union's much vaunted
common asylum system.
I. MASS DISPLACEMENT AND THE REFUGE CRISIS IN EUROPE IN 2015
To understand the challenges faced by asylum seekers in Europe within
the last two years, it is important to assess both the events that forced them to
leave their homeland and the network of European laws that they must
navigate.
First, the refugees. Europe currently faces its largest refugee crisis since
World War II. 4 Frontex, the EU border management agency, counted 1.8

pk2cnn [https://perma.cc/W6PD-9LOC]; Photographs of Europeans welcoming refugees, in 3
Heartwarming Scenes of Europe Cheering for Refugees Arriving by Bus, GOOD NEWS
NETWORK (Sept. 13, 2015), http://www.goodnewsnetwork.org/3-heartwarming-scenes-ofeuropeans-cheering-for-refugees-arrivinc-by-bus-watch/ [https://perma.cc/6DFK-C8491;
Photographs of Europeans welcoming refugees, in Jay Akbar, Jennifer Smith, and Lydia
Willgress, Sleeping in his father's arms: After an epicjourney by boat, on foot and by train a
young Syrian boy is one of thousands of refugees to arrive in Germany as there arefresh calls
for actions in Syria, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 5, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-

3223222/4-000-migrants-arrive-Austria-Hungarian-government-lays-buses-refugeesBudapest-just-hours-thousands-started-walk-100-miles-border.html [https://perma.cc/WCA9EDGS.
3 See HIL NE LAMBERT, JANE McADAM & MARYELLEN FULLERTON, THE GLOBAL REACH
OF EUROPEAN REFUGEE LAW 18-23 (2013) (the case law of both the European Human Rights

Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union prominently examines whether European
governments uphold the non-refoulement principle).
' Lydia DePillis, Kulwant Saluja, & Denise Lu, A Visual Guide to 75 Years ofMajor Refugee
Crises

Around

the

World,

WASH.

POST

(Dec.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/historical-migrant-crisis/
[http://perma.cc/SJ2X-8LCA].

15,

2015),
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million asylum seekers crossing the EU frontiers in 2015. 5 EU governments
reported that 1.3 million individuals registered as asylum seekers, 6 with 1.1
million registering in Germany alone. 7 The unprecedented logistical
challenges that this crisis presents are clear from comparisons with statistics8
from prior years: in 2012, the EU states registered 300,000 asylum seekers;
in 2013, 400,000; 9 in 2014, 627,000 (of which 200,000 filed asylum claims in
Germany). 10
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) reports that most of the 1.1 million asylum seekers registered in
Europe in 2015 came from countries experiencing war and persecution,
suggesting that a high proportion have valid claims to asylum. "I
The Syrian civil war has been the central factor prompting this mass
influx of people to Europe. As the war enters its sixth year, half of the
country's pre-war population has been forcibly displaced. 1 2 This staggering
proportion-the US equivalent would be 158 million people forced from their
homes-has catapulted Syria to world leadership in suffering: one in every
five displaced persons in the world today is Syrian.' 3 Of the 10.6 million
Syrians who have fled their homes, 4.6 million have crossed Syria's borders
to neighboring countries and registered as refugees. 14 These neighbors have
been generous. Turkey hosts 2.6 million registered Syrians. 15 Lebanon, a
country of 4 million, hosts 1.1 million Syrian refugees, while Jordan hosts

5

Migratory Routes Map, FRONTEX: EUROPEAN BORDER AND COASTGUARD AGENCY,

http://frontex.eur opa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2016)
[http://perma.cc/2Y4T-VU6B] (this number refers to number of border crossings and
acknowledges that one person may have crossed multiple times).
6
Asylum
Statistics,
EUROSTAT,
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Asylum statistics#Asylum-applicants (last visited Oct. 20, 2016)
[http://perma.cc/7M3H-7RVQ].
7 Id.
8 Id.

9 Id.
10 Id.
11

Refugees/Migrants

Emergency

Response

http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php
[http://perma.cc/D5NF-DB8A].

(last

-

Mediterranean,

visited

Oct.

7,

UNHCR,

2016)

12 Mark Bixler & Michael Martinez, War Forced Halfof All Syrians From Home. Here's

Where They Went, CNN (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/l /world/syriarefugee-crisis-when-war-displaces-half-a-country/ [http://perma.cc/9WYP-B7Z9].
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
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635,000.16 Many more refugees may be unregistered.
This generosity, however, has its limits. These countries have not granted
Syrians permission to work. 17 Thus, the refugees have had to deplete their
savings, and then seek work in the informal labor market where they are
underpaid and vulnerable. 18 Even when Turkey agreed to authorize
employment for Syrian refugees, as part of the March 2016 agreement with
the EU to readmit all refugees who left Turkey for Europe, 19 fewer than 0.1
percent of refugees gained access to the Turkish labor market. 20 The
prohibition against employment is just one example of the precarious situation
Syrians have confronted in their countries of first refuge. Refuge became even
more untenable in September 2015 when a lack of resources led the World
Food Program to eliminate food vouchers for one-third of the Syrian refugees
in the Middle East. 2 1 The downward spiral of the humanitarian situation in
Syria, the seemingly endless civil war, and multiple other factors have also
contributed to the decisions of many Syrians to seek safety in Europe.
The problems associated with this mass displacement have been
compounded by the fact that the sudden arrival of thousands of Syrian
refugees has coincided with increasing forced displacement in other countries,
such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Approximately 500,000 Afghans fled their
homes during the decade of intense conflict between 2002 and 2012.22 By the
end of 2015, that number had increased to 1.2 million, with approximately
1000 Afghans fleeing their homes every day.23 Meanwhile, warfare and

16

Id.

E.g., Overview of Right to Work ofRefugees, Syria CrisisResponse: Lebanon andJordan,
INT'L RESCUE COMMfTTEE (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resourcefile/IRC%20Policy%/20Brief /20Right%20to%20Work/o20 for0/20Refugees%20.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6EJU-K2KE].
18 Patrick Kingsley, Fewer Than 0.1% of Syrians in Turkey In Line for Work Permits, THE
GUARDIANi (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/1 I/fewer-than-0 1-ofsyrians-in-turkey-in-line-for-work-permits [http://perma.cc/K9ZX-4PKZ].
'9 The European Council Press Release 144/16, EU-Turkey Statement (Mar. 18, 2016),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey- statement/
[http://perma.cc/658V-ZFU9].
20 Kingsley, supra note 18.
21 Associated Press, Lack of Funds: World Food ProgrammeDrops Aid to One-third of
Syrian
Refugees,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
4,
2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/05/lack-of-funds-world-food-programme-dropsaid-to-one-third-of-syrian-refugees.
22 Mujib Mashal & Zahra Nader, 1,000 Afghans Each Day Are Fleeing Their Homes, N.Y.
TIMEs (June 1, 2016).
23 Id.; After more than three decades of of conflict and displacement, the global Afghan
'7
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displacement gripped Iraq. In 2014 and 2015, as part of its violent campaign
to take control of Iraqi cities such as Ramadi, the Islamic State24 (ISIS) was
responsible for the displacement of more than 2.6 million Iraqis.
Most of the more than one million refugees and asylum seekers who
crossed the Mediterranean Sea in 2015 to escape violent conflicts in their
home countries, departed from Turkey and landed in Greece. 2 5 Fifty percent
were Syrians; twenty percent were Afghan; and seven percent were Iraqi. 26
These sizeable numbers are a testament to the extreme warfare and suffering
wreaking havoc in these countries. Other areas of conflict and human rights
abuse, such as Eritrea, a notoriously oppressive one-party state, 27 were also
28
responsible for a significant portion of the refugees who landed in Europe.
In short, armed conflict and political repression have reached a fever pitch
in the region close to southeastern Europe. After five years or more of refuge
in Turkey and surrounding areas, many Syrian and Iraqi refugees have become
desperate to find a measure of stability. Joined by streams of asylum seekers
from Afghanistan and Eritea and other conflict zones in Africa and Asia,
increasing numbers have set set sail across the Mediterannean Sea. They hope
to find legal protection and safety in Europe. They confront complex layers
of European law.
H. OVERLAPPING LEGAL REGIMES:

EU ASYLUM LAW AND EUROPEAN

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

Refugees arriving in Europe face two overlapping legal regimes: the laws
created by the Council of Europe and those enacted by the EU. Forty-seven
refugee population amounted to 2.7 million in 2015. UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS 2015, supra
note 1, at 16.
24 Patrick Cockburn, Refugee Crisis: Where are all These People Coming From and Why?,
THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 7, 2015). See, e.g., Ben Hubbard, Ramadi, Reclaimed by Iraq, is in
Ruins After ISIS Fight,N.Y. TMES (Jan. 7, 2016).
25 UNHCR reports that 1,000,573 asylum seekers entered Europe via the Mediterranean in
2015, with 150,000 landing in Italy and most of the rest landing in Greece. Jonathan Clayton
& Hereward Holland, Over One Million Sea Arrivals Reach Europe in 2015, UNHCR (Dec.
30, 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/12/5683d0b56/million-sea-arrivals-reacheurope-2015.html [https://perma.cc/34S9-33QL].
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, Border Clashes Between Ethiopia and Eritrea Heighten
(June
13,
2016),
of
War,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Fears
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/world/africa/border-clashes-between-ethiopia-anderitrea-heighten-fears-of-war.html [https://perma.cc/KU2Y-FV8A].
28 Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts, BBC (Mar. 4, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911 [https://perma.cc/EGR4-TYT6].
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European countries, stretching from the United Kingdom to Russia, and
including Turkey, 29 are members of the Council of Europe and are state parties
to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

(European Human Rights Convention). 30 This treaty prohibits states from
exposing residents to torture or inhumane or degrading treatment or
punishment. 3 1 Furthermore, it forbids state parties from expelling individuals
32
to another state where they will face inhumane or degrading treatment.

Although it does not provide a right to asylum, the European Human Rights
Convention protects asylum seekers from deportation to their home country if
that country will subject them to inhumane treatment upon their return. 33 As
a result of this protection, many asylum seekers petition the European Court
of Human Rights to allow them to remain in Europe.
Twenty-eight of the Council of Europe states belong to the EU.34 All EU
members agree to abide by EU standards, enact EU laws as part of their
national legislation, and enforce EU law. 35 EU law includes a Charter of
Fundamental Rights that parallels the provisions of the European Human
Rights Convention. 36 It is largely redundant; for example, it, too, prohibits

All European countries other than Belarus are members of the Council of Europe. See
Our Member States, COUNCIL OF EuR., http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/our-member-states
(last visited Oct. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/TTK7-36V6].
30 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). The ECHR was signed on
November 4, 1950, came into force on September 3, 1953, and has been expanded and modified
by seventeen Protocols. There are currently forty-seven state parties to the convention. See Full
List: Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 005, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list//conventions/treaty/005/signatures?pauth=h3qlInPT
(last visited Oct.
18, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/82FJ-2XZ7].
31 ECHR, supra note 30, art. 3 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhumane or
degrading treatment or punishment").
32 Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989), discussed infra notes 98-99.
33 E.g., Cruz Varas & Others v. Sweden, 1991 Eur. Ct. H.R. 26, discussed infra notes 100103.
34 The United Kingdom referendum on June 23, 2016, which registered a majority voting to
leave the EU has not yet gone into effect. Article 50 of the EU Treaty of Lisbon permits
Member States to withdraw from the EU, a process that starts when the withdrawing State files
a formal notice and must conclude within two years of the formal withdrawal notice. If, and
when the United Kingdom withdraws, there will be 27 Member States in the EU.
31 "Once an applicant country meets the conditions for membership, it must apply EU rules
and regulations in all areas." Joining the EU, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/europeanunion/about-eu/countries/j oining-eu en [perma.cc/U3Q7-G4U4].
36 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01) [hereinafter
29
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37
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.
One significant difference, however, is that EU law expressly guarantees
a right to asylum. 38 To explain this difference, it is necessary to revisit the
history and development of EU asylum law. During the first half century of
the EU, matters of migration and asylum were strictly within the sovereign
control of individual EU member states. 3 9 By the end of the twentieth century,
this had begun to change. In 1999, after concluding that a common asylum
and migration policy was fundamental to the goal of transforming the EU into
an area of freedom, security, and justice, 40 the EU countries committed
themselves to developing an EU-wide statutory basis for asylum. 4 1 The EU
countries pledged to develop and enact a legal framework for a uniform
asylum process between 2000 and 2005 as part of the first phase of the EU
Common European Asylum System (CEAS). After lengthy negotiations, the
EU accomplished this goal: by 2005, the42EU had enacted asylum legislation
that still applies in every EU state today.
The first law enacted as part of the CEAS was the 2000 EURODAC
Regulation, which established a central registry of fingerprints for all asylum
seekers. 43 The next year saw the enactment of EU legislation creating a
mechanism to establish a temporary protection scheme in the event of a mass
influx of migrants. 44 Two major pieces of CEAS followed in 2003: the

Charter].
37 Charter, art. 4: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhumane or degrading treatment
or punishment."
38 Council Directive 2011/95/EU, art. 9-10, 2011 O.J. (L 337/9) (enacted in 2011 with two
years for transposition into national legislation).
39 Federal Republic of Germany and others v. Commission of the European Communities,
Case C-281/85, [1987] E.C.R. 3203 (ruling that the Eu Commission had exceeded its authority
by requiring EU member states to report data concerning workers who entered the EU from
non-EU states).
40

Id.

Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, E.U. BULL., no. 10, (1999),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tamen.htm [http://perma.cc/8SLH-QAMA].
42 Council Directive 2013/32/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 180/60) [hereinafter Parliament and Council
Directive on Procedures for International Protection] (enacted in December 2005 with two
years for transposition into national legislation, and revised legislation enacted in June 2013).
43 Council Regulation 2725/2000/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 316/1) [hereinafter Eurodac Regulation].
A revised Eurodac Regulation, Council Regulaton 603/2013/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 180/1), was
enacted in 2013 and went into effect in 2015.
44 Council Directive 2001/55, 2001 O.J. (L 212) 12 (EC) (regarding minimum standards for
giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures
promoting a balance of efforts between member states in receiving such persons and bearing
41
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Reception Conditions Directive, which sets standards for food, shelter, and
other services that states must provide to individuals during the asylum
process, 4 5 and the Dublin Regulation, which sets forth criteria for deciding
which EU country is responsible for deciding an asylum claim. 46 Later, in
2004, the EU also adopted the Qualification Directive, 47 which guarantees
asylum to two categories of individuals. Individuals in the first category are
eligible for refugee status; they must show they fear persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular
social group. 48 Individuals in the second category are eligible for subsidiary
protection, which typically involves a renewable residence permit for a shorter
period than refugee status; 49 this group includes those fleeing other serious
harm, such as indiscriminate violence resulting from armed conflict. 50 The
last element of the CEAS came into place with the 2005 Asylum Procedures
Directive. 51 This law requires states to conduct personal interviews with
asylum seekers,52 deliver notice concerning the asylum process in a language

the consequences thereof).
45 Council Directive 2003/9, 2003 O.J. (L 31) 18 (EC) [hereinafter Reception Conditions
Directive] (laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers in the Member
States). A revised Reception Conditions Directive, Directive 2013/33, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 96
(EU), went into effect in 2015.
46 Council Regulation 343/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 50) 1 (EC) [Dublin Regulation] (establishing
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an
asylum application lodged in one of the member states by a third-country national). A revised
Dublin Regulation, Council Regulation 604/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 31 (EU) [Dublin IiI]
(establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the member states by a
third-country national or a stateless person), went into effect in 2014.
17 Council Directive 2004/83, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (EC) on minimum standards for the
qualification and status of third-country national or stateless persons as refugees or as persons
who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted
[hereinafter Qualification Directive]. A revised Qualification Directive on the standards for
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international
protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection,
and for the content of the protection grants went into effect in 2013. Supra note 38.
48 Qualification Directive, art. 9-14.
49 Id. art. 24.
50

Id. art. 15.

51

Parliament and Council Directive on Procedures for International Protection, supra note

42.
52

Id. arts. 12, 14-17.

54
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asylum seekers can understand,5 3 furnish interpreters, 54 and permit
consultation with UNHCR and with legal counsel, 55 as well as ensuring other
procedural safeguards. Thus, as the first phase of the CEAS drew to a close,
legislation with detailed uniform standards for processing asylum claims was
in place throughout the EU.
lII. A DYSFUNCTIONAL SYSTEM: THE INABILITY OF THE EU ASYLUM
SYSTEM TO RESPOND TO THE CURRENT REFUGEE CRISIS

Ten years after the foundational elements of EU asylum law were
established, the common EU asylum system is in shambles. Gateway
countries, such as Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy, and Spain, have been
required to uphold the EU right to asylum and subsidiary protection and
simultaneously comply with the European human rights prohibition against
inhumane and degrading treatment, a task which has proven virtually
impossible given the mass influx of refugees in 2015. The large numbers of
asylum seekers in Greece and Italy and other countries on the frontiers of the
EU have strained those governments' resources to the breaking point. They
have faltered in their attempts to provide shelter, food, clothing, medical care,
56
and adequate legal proceedings to hundreds of thousands of new arrivals. ,
At times, asylum seekers have been left literally homeless, sleeping on the
streets and in parks.57 As a result of the disproportionately large numbers of
refugees arriving in some of the EU countries, the situation of refugees and
asylum seekers has varied dramatically between EU states. Rather than facing
a uniform asylum system throughout Europe, many individuals have instead
found themselves facing multiple state systems, with some of the frontline
states offering little to no assistance. It has become apparent that the
impressive enactment of numerous EU-wide asylum statutes in the initial
CEAS phase has not been matched by equally effective implementation. The
practice on the ground deviates significantly from the law on the books.
In retrospect, this was fated to happen. Since its inception, the CEAS had
adopted a minimum standards approach, which only required each EU state to
meet minimum standards set forth in the asylum legislation, and left it to the

53

Id. art. 10(1)(a).

5

Id. art. 10(1)(b).

51 Id. arts. 19-23.
56 See, e.g., Maryellen Fullerton, Asylum Crisis Italian Style: The Dublin Regulation
Collides with European Human Rights Law, 29 HARV. HUM. RTs. L.J. 57, 87-91 (2016)
(describing deplorable conditions endured by asylum seekers in Italy and Greece).
11 Id. at 82-87, 99-102.
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states' discretion whether they would provide asylum seekers with the bare
minimum or with more generous protections. 58 As a consequence of this
limited approach, many EU states were able to tweak their national asylum
laws in ways that more or less maintained the asylum processes in place prior
to the effort to create a uniform EU system. Thus, the current common asylum
system is, in reality, a patchwork of different asylum systems. Some states
provide better accommodations; some states provide quicker asylum
proceedings; some states have more judges and better trained judges; some
state adjudicators are more likely to grant applications filed by Afghan asylum
seekers; and so forth. For asylum seekers, this means that the reception
conditions and the chances of being granted asylum vary enormously among
the EU states. 5 9 These variations have created powerful incentives for
applicants to file for asylum in the EU states where the chances of success are
greater and the asylum accommodations are better.
In recognition of this looming problem, the CEAS enacted the Dublin
Regulation, an instrument that prevents asylum seekers from choosing the EU
country in which to apply for asylum. 60 As the EU venue statute for asylum
cases, the Dublin Regulation sets forth "objective, fair criteria... [to] make it
possible to determine rapidly the Member State responsible, so as to guarantee
effective access to the [asylum] procedures." 61 According to the Dublin
Regulation, family ties, residence documents, and geographical location are
the three major criteria that should determine which EU state is responsible
for deciding the merits of an asylum application. 62 If an asylum applicant has
family members who have received asylum in an EU state 63 or family
members whose asylum applications are pending in that state, 64 then the EU
state where the family member resides is responsible for the new asylum
58

E.g., the 2003 Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 45, pmbl. secs. 3, 15, states

that the CEAS should include "common minimum conditions of reception of asylum seekers,"
and acknowledges that "[iut is in the very nature of minimum standards that Member States
have the power to introduce or maintain more favourable provisions for third-country
nationals.., who ask for [asylum]".
19 See, e.g., M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 255 (describing the
inhumane asylum system in Greece); Tarakhel v. Switzerland and Italy, 2014-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.
(describing systemic deficiencies in reception conditions in Italy); UNHCR, ASYLUM INTHE
EUROPEAN UNION: A STUDY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE, 8
(Nov. 2007).
60 Dublin HI Regulation, supra note 46.

Id., pmbl. sec. 5.
62 Id., arts. 9-13.
63 Id., art. 9.
64 Id., art. 10.
61
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applicant. If an asylum applicant has residence documents or visas for an EU
state, then the EU state that issued the documents is responsible for deciding
the asylum claim.6 5 If there are no family members or entry documents, then
the first EU state the asylum seeker enters is responsible for determining the
merits of the asylum application. 66 As a practical matter, this third-level
criterion is the only one of significance. More than 90 percent of the asylum
EU states pursuant to the Dublin
seekers whose cases are transferred between
67
Regulation fall into the last category.
Because EU law pushes asylum seekers with no family connection to an
EU state back to the geographical location where they first crossed into the
EU, the EU states on the southern and eastern borders, through which most
asylum seekers travel, bear the brunt of the Dublin Regulation. 68 These states
are typically poorer with less developed asylum systems, fewer state
resources, and a lack of civil society institutions that are able to assist
desperate and vulnerable individuals. Greece is the paramount example.
More than 850,000 asylum seekers entered the EU via Greece in 2015,69 a
year in which Greek society was still reeling from its debt crisis. At the end
of 2014, Greek government debt had reached 175 percent of gross domestic
product, by far the highest percentage of debt in the EU, 7 0 and unemployment
was at 25 percent, again the highest in the EU.7 '
While the unprecedented economic crisis in Greece has exacerbated the
refugee problems there, the issues arising from design flaws in the CEAS
extend far beyond Greece's borders. By assigning the responsibility of
evaluating asylum claims to the countries through which an asylum seeker
first enters Europe, the EU asylum system allows wealthier northern EU states
to avoid determining asylum applications. As a result, these northern EU
states send asylum seekers back to the poorer southern and eastern EU states,
which are less equipped to manage large numbers of applicants. A look at
comparative economic data emphasizes the disparities among EU states and
65
66

67

Id., art. 12.
Id., art. 13.
See Susan Fratzke, Not Adding Up: The FadingPromise of Europe's Dublin System,

MIGRATION POL'Y INST. EuR. 8 (Mar. 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/notadding-fading-promise-europes-dublin-system [https://perma.cc/H84Z-LZEH].
68 Id.
69

70

Clayton & Holland, supra note 25.
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17,

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/international/greece-debt-crisiseuro.html?emc=etal &_r=0 [https://perma.cc/98Z3-CVRW].
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the irrationality of the EU asylum policy. Countries on the eastern border of
the EU, such as Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Hungary, and Poland, report
respective per capita gross domestic product rates of $7851, $10,000, $13,475,
$14,026, and $14,336.72 States on the southern periphery of the EU, including
Greece, Spain, and Italy, report per capita gross domestic product figures
ranging from $21,672 to $29,721 to $35,222. 7 3 By contrast, central and
northern EU states, which rely on the Dublin Regulation to transfer asylum
seekers back to the EU state of entrance, are much wealthier. For instance,
the per capita gross domestic product in Austria is $51,122, in Belgium
$47,327, in Germany $47,773, and in Sweden $58,898. 74
Turning to the data reflecting the impact of the Dublin Regulation on the
flows of asylum seekers across the EU, Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden
were the three states that relied most heavily on the Dublin Regulation in
recent years to shift responsibility to other EU states. 7 5 In total, Germany and
Switzerland filed more than forty percent of the Dublin transfer requests in
2012;76 Germany alone filed more than 43 percent of the requests in 2013. 77
On the receiving end, Italy, Poland, and Hungary were the three countries that
were requested to accept the largest numbers of transfers of asylum seekers in
2013.78 In total, Italy and Poland received more than forty percent of the
Dublin transfer requests filed in 2012 and in 2013. 79 Clearly, the Dublin
Regulation has enabled the wealthier EU countries to send asylum seekers
back to the less wealthy EU countries. If these transfers were based on
connections between the asylum seekers and family members currently in the
receiving states, that might be sensible. But most of the Dublin transfers are
justified solely by the geographical happenstance that the asylum seekers
entered the EU by crossing the poorer frontier states that line its land and sea
borders.

72
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BANK,

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?page=l
[https://perma.cc/TB3CQZT8]. For comparison, the World Bank reported the per capita GDP of the United States in
2014 as $54,629. Id.
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Id.

75 Fratzke, supra note 67, at 8. Switzerland, though not a member state of the European
Union, has agreed via treaty, Counsel Decision, 2008/146, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 53) 1, 2 (EC), to
participate in the terms of the Dublin Regulation.
76 Fratzke, supra note 67, at 8.
77

Id.

78 Id. at 9.
71 Id. at 8.
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The Dublin Regulation's pressure on the weaker EU states and the
minimum standards approach that has yielded significant variability in asylum
systems within the EU, are major design flaws in the CEAS. They are,
however, emblems of a more fundamental problem: the absence of political
will to address asylum as a collective responsibility. In September 2015, news
headlines around the world dramatized this core failure of the CEAS-the lack
of recognition that Europe must take collective action to respond to those who
need asylum-as EU states criticized and stalled proposals by the European
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker 80 and by European Council
President Donald Tusk. 81 Finally, the European Union, over the opposition
of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, voted to relocate
120,000 refugees from Greece, Italy, and Hungary to other EU countries over
two years. 82 Slovakia immediately threatened to defy the EU refugee
relocation plan, 83 leading an Italian diplomat to warn that the refugee crisis is
"more dangerous than the Greek drama and more serious than the euro,
because it challenges fundamental European accomplishments and beliefs. 84
Thus far, the warning has not led to a change of heart. By March 2016, EU
countries had relocated fewer than one thousand refugees from Greece and
Italy. 85 Three months later, the numbers relocated are still small, and the
European Commission has proposed a € 250,000 penalty 86per person on EU
states that fail to meet their refugee relocation obligations.

80 Migrant Crisis: EU's Juncker Announces Refugee Quota Plan, BBC NEWS (Sept. 9,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34193568 [https://perma.cc/2EWW-YR36].
81 James Crisp, Tusk Calls Emergency Summit on Refugee Crisis, EuRACTV.COM (Sept. 17,
2015),
http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/tusk-calls-emergencysummit-on-refugee-crisis [https://perma.cc/61AC-URS3].
82
European Commission Press Release MEMO/15/5698, Refugee Crisis - Q & A on
Emergency Relocation (Sept. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Refugee Crisis Q & A]; Migrant Crisis:
EU Ministers Approve Disputed Quota Plan, BBC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2015),
[https://perma~cc/H3YS-SM4U]
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34329825
(relocating 40,000 had been recommended in May 2015, for a total of 160,000 refugees
relocated within the EU).
83 Steven Erlanger & James Kanter, Plan on MigrantsStrains the Limits ofEurope's Unity,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.con/2015/09/23/world/europe/europeanunion-ministers-migrants-refugees.htrnl [https://perma.cc/9AZZ-F3J3].
84 Id.
85 Jon Henley, EURefugee Relocation Scheme Is Inadequate and Will Continue to Fail,THE
GuDRnAN (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/04/eu-refugeerelocation-scheme-inadequate-will-continue-to-fail [https://perma.cc/M78A-LNUW].
86 Migrant Crisis: EU Plans Penaltiesfor Refusing Asylum Seekers, BBC NEWS (May 4,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36202490 [https://perma.cc/38ZB-VEJY].
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Ironically, despite the fears of uncontrolled migration featured in the June
2016 Brexit campaign, the EU refugee relocation decision has had no impact
on refugees in the United Kingdom. 87 Because the British government had
previously negotiated the right to opt out of EU emergency relocation
schemes, the EU 2015 relocation plan effort assigned no refugees to the
United Kingdom. 88 Prior to the EU Council's September 2015 mandatory
refugee relocation plan, the United Kingdom had launched the Vulnerable
Person Relocation scheme. Pursuant to this program, the United Kingdom
granted asylum to 187 Syrian refugees. 89 This minuscule number of refugees
arrived pursuant to a UK decision, not as a result of EU action.
Meanwhile, the European Union responded to the 2015 surge in refugees
by negotiating with Turkey, where the majority of refugees had departed en
route to Europe. In March 2016, Turkey agreed that all refugees crossing from
Turkey to Greece as of March 20, 2016 would be returned to Turkey, and in
exchange, the EU agreed to allow refugees from camps in Turkey to resettle
in the EU. 90 After the agreement went into effect, the numbers of arrivals in
Greece plummeted from 6800 per day in October 2015 to 50 per day in May
2016.91 The drop in the number of new arrivals has not been coupled with an
increase in the number of those being returned to Turkey, however. Greece
92
has returned only 390 migrants to Turkey since the pact became effective.
Furthermore, many asylum seekers in Greece have charged that it would be
unsafe for them to return to Turkey. By early summer, Greece had only
reviewed 318 applications of those filed by the 8500 asylum seekers who had
arrived since late March. 93 The combination of slow processing times and
court rulings that Turkey is not a safe country to which the claimants can be
returned is worrisome for those who initially believed the EU-Turkey deal
94
would reverse the refugee flows to Europe.

87

Refugee Crisis Q & A, supra note 82.

88 Id.

19 Sam Ashworth-Hayes, How Many Syrian Refugees Are There in the UK, FULL FACT (Feb.
17,
2016),
https://fullfact.org/immigration/how-many-syrian-refugees-are-there-uk/
[https://perma.cc/ZA6L-EJKS].
90 European Commission Press Release MEMO/16/1221, Implementing the EU-Turkey
Agreement- Questions and Answers (Apr. 4, 2016).
91 Nektaria Stamouli, Greece Struggles to Return Migrants Under EU-Turkey Deal, WALL
STREET J., (May 19, 2016, 6:27 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/greece-struggles-to-returnmigrants-under-eu-turkey-deal- 1463653671 [https://perma.cc/FPA5-TBZ8].
92 Id.
93 Id.

94 Id.
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While it is still too early to provide a definitive assessment of the future
development of the common EU asylum structures, the outlook is bleak.
95
Attacks by terrorists and mentally unstable individuals in France,
Belgium, 96 and Germany 97 have heightened fears across the continent, and
stories that some of the assailants mingled with the throng of asylum seekers
who entered Europe in 2015 have inspired xenophobia and anti-refugee
sentiments. 98 Thus far, the EU has not been able to devise an effective
approach to the major humanitarian challenge posed by the current refugee
crisis. The exceedingly slow implementation of the March 2016 EU-Turkey
plan and the apparent lack of EU resources offered to assist Greece with the
overwhelming numbers of its asylum seekers broadcast an aura of
incompetence and a lack of political will.
It must be said that there is some good news, even though it has received
far less attention from the media. Many EU countries, Germany in particular,
have been able to feed and house the more than one million asylum seekers
who arrived in a few short months. 99 Though the reception has not been
95 Truck Attack in Nice, France:What We Know, and What We Don't, N.Y. TIMES (July 14,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/20 16/07/1 5/world/europe/nice-france-truck-attack-what-weknow.html?_r-1 [https://perma.cc/85PC-JW9C]; Liz Alderman & Jim Yardley, Paris Terror
Attacks Leave Awful Realization: Another Massacre, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/1 1/14/world/europe/paris-terror-attack.html
[https://perma.cc/J86Y-EFLK].
96 Alissa J. Rubin, Aurelien Breeden & Anita Raghavan, Strikes Claimed by ISIS Shut
(Mar. 22,
2016),
Brussels and Shake European Security, N.Y. TIMES
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/world/europe/brussels-airport-explosions.html
[https://perma.cc/W4PZ-N7C2].
97 Rukmini Callimachi & Melissa Eddy, Munich Killer Was Troubled, But Had No Terrorist
TIMES
(July
23,
2016),
Germany
Says,
N.Y.
Ties,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/24/world/europe/munich-shooting-attack.html
[https://perma.cc/8GDG-7HH3]; Melissa Eddy & Boryana Dzhambazova, Refugee orJihadist?
Leaders Can 'tAlways Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2016, at A3.
98 See, e.g., Aurelien Breeden & Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura, ThirdBody Is Found in Rubble
20,
2015),
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
Raid
near
Paris,
of
Police
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/21/world/europe/paris-attacks.html
[https://perma.cc/D7VW-SWNZ]; Rick Lyman, Regulating Flow of Refugees Gains Urgency
25,
2015),
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
of Europe,
in
Greece and Rest
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/26/world/europe/regulating-flow-of-refugees-gainsurgency-in-greece-and-rest-of-europe.html [https://perma.cc/DEE8-TQLB]; Adam Nossiter &
Liz Alderman, After ParisAttacks, a Darker Mood Toward Islam Emerges in France, N.Y.
T[MES (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/17/world/europe/after-paris-attacksa-darker-mood-toward-islam-emerges-in-france.html [http://perma.cc/4XSH-TSXK].
99 See, e.g., Katrin Bennhold, German City by the Danube Is Tested by a Different Kind of
Flood,N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7,2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/08/world/europe/german-
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entirely seamless, EU countries have provided shelter to large numbers of
people who suddenly have appeared at their borders. Nonetheless, the bad
news predominates. The lack of acknowledgment by EU governments that
they need to work collectively in response to asylum seekers, combined with
the absence of a functioning EU plan, broadcasts the view that the EU cannot
handle this crisis. The critics of the EU response to the refugee crisis are in
sync with the public mood. The magnitude of the refugees' needs will
continue to present profound challenges to Europe, and the common European
asylum system appears broken.
IV. THE RISE OF THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

In contrast to the growing dissatisfaction with the EU in general, and the
EU asylum system in particular, the European Court of Human Rights has
been increasing in power and legitimacy. In the early years, the European
Human Rights Court issued very few judgments, only 160 in the first thirty
years after its founding in 1959.1°0 Initially, individuals could not directly file
petitions; only the States or the European Human Rights Commission were
permitted to file cases with the Court. 10 1 The Court became more active in
the last decade of the twentieth century, when it issued close to 800
judgments. 10 2 At the end of the twentieth century, when the Court was
reorganized to allow individuals to file petitions on their own,10 3 the volume

city-by-the-danube-is-tested-by-a-different-kind-of-flood.html [http://perma.cc/BRY6-RR36]
(noting that Passau volunteers welcome refugees; government finds shelter); Philip Oltermann,
Germany Unveils Integration Law for Refugees, ThE GuARDIAN (Apr. 14, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/14/germany-unveils-integration-law-forrefugees-migrants [http://perma.cc/ECB5-S7Q9] (noting that after receiving more than one
million new arrivals in 2015, the numbers have decreased in 2016; Germany has introduced
new legislation and policies to increase employment for refugees and to enhance integration
into German society).
100 European Court of Human Rights, Survey: Forty Years of Activity, 1959-1998, 27-38
(Sept.
1998),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Surveyl 9591998_BIL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5X9W-PJGM].
101 Id. at 1.
102 Id. at 4.
103 Id. Protocol No. 9 to the European Human Rights Convention permitted the European

Human Rights Court to hear claims filed by individuals so long as the Contracting State had
consented. ECHR, supra note 30, Protocol No. 9. It went into effect in 1995. European Court
of Human Rights, supra note 100, at 1. Protocol 11 accomplished a wholesale reorganization
of the European human rights machinery, abolished the European Human Rights Commission,
increased the judges and staff of the European Human Rights Court, and authorized individuals
to file suit. Id.
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of the Court's work increased dramatically.
The European Human Rights Court has become known as an activist
court, one that has generally taken an expansive view of the scope of its
jurisdiction and competence. Government compliance with adverse rulings is
high, and voluminous books and articles detail the Court's history, the content
of its rulings, and its significance in the development of human rights law
around the world. This Part highlights two aspects of the Court's
jurisprudence: (1) its expansion of the geographical scope of its jurisdiction
and (2) its insistence that EU asylum law be scrutinized under European
human rights standards.
As mentioned above, Article 3 of the European Human Rights
Convention prohibits governments from subjecting citizens and residents to
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. 10 4 In 1989, the European
Human Rights Court interpreted this provision to forbid the UK government's
extradition of Jens Soering, a German national, to the United States to stand
trial for murdering his girlfriend's parents. 10 5 The Court concluded that, in
light of Soering's age and mental condition, the prison conditions and the
lengthy period he might spend on death row constituted inhumane or
degrading treatment. 10 6 Although the UK government itself did not treat
Soering cruelly or inhumanely, the Court ruled that Article 3 prevented the
United Kingdom from relying on its extradition law in this case because
European human rights law also protected European citizens from potentially
inhumane treatment in the United States.
Two years later the European Human Rights Court applied this
interpretation of Article 3 to Sweden's expulsion of a Chilean asylum
seeker. 10 7 Hector Cruz Varas was a political dissident in Pinochet's Chile
who claimed he was active in anti-Pinochet groups in Sweden. The Swedish
government denied his claim and deported him to Chile in October 1989,108
one year after Pinochet had lost a referendum paving the way for democracy
to return. 10 9 Again, the European Human Rights Court examined the
104
101
106

ECHR, supra note 30, art. 3.
Soering v UnitedKingdom, 11 EHRR 439, (1989), Judgment of 7 July 1989.
Virginia gave assurances that Soering would not face the death penalty, the UK extradited

him, he was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to two life terms in prison.
107 Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, supra note 33.
108 Id. at para. 33.
109 Chile lifted the Pinochet dictatorship's state of emergency in 1988 and allowed political
exiles to return. A referendum in October 1988 rejected Pinochet's government. A new
constitution was adopted in 1989, followed by democratic elections in December 1989. Id. at
para. 34.
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inhumane or degrading treatment that the applicant might face outside of
Europe in its analysis of whether Article 3 restrained the actions of a European
government.11 0 After an exhaustive review of the facts and applicable laws,
the Court concluded that Sweden's deportation of Cruz Varas had not
subjected him to cruel or inhumane treatment upon his return to Chile.1 11 But
the Court did not hesitate in examining the circumstances in Chile to ascertain
Sweden's obligation under the European Human Rights Convention. As in
Soering, the Cruz Varas judgment effectively added a non-refoulement
obligation 112 to the terms of Article 3, thus expanding the geographical scope
of the European human rights law.
In 2012, the Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy decision extended the reach of the
European Human Rights Convention to the high seas. 113 Roughly 200 Somali
and Eritrean asylum seekers had left Libya on small boats heading for safety
in Europe. 114 Italian patrol boats intercepted the migrants' boats in
international waters, loaded the migrants onto Italian military ships, and
returned them to Libya, without providing any opportunity for the individuals
to seek asylum. 115 The situation in Libya was chaotic and dangerous, with no
functioning asylum law. 116 As a consequence, Italy had breached the
prohibition against degrading or inhumane treatment. 117 The Court ruled that
the extraterritorial effect of the European human rights law not only applies to
expulsion decisions made by migration officials in Europe, but also extends

110 After an exhaustive review of the facts and the applicable laws, the Court ultimately ruled
that Sweden's expulsion of Cruz Varas had not violated Art. 3. Id. at paras. 82, 84.
SId. at para 86.
112 Refoulement is the French term for returning refugees to persecution. DAVID A. MARTIN,
T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, HiROSm MOTOMURA & MARYELLEN FULLERTON, FORCED

57, 88 (2d ed. 2013). Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, art. 33, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (prohibiting states from returning refugees
to territories where their lives or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group). The non-refoulement
obligation set forth by Article 33 is the linchpin of refugee law. Id. Other human rights treaties,
such as the Convention Against Torture, Dec. 10, 1984, 1468 U.N.T.S. 85, also include an
explicit prohibition against refoulement. As described in the text above, the jurisprudence of
the European Human Rights Court includes a prohibition against returning individuals to
countries where they will face threats of torture or inhumane or degrading treatment or
punishment.
113 Hirsi Jamaa & Others v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).
114 Id. at para. 9
115 Id. atparas. 10-12.
116 Id. atparas. 15-17, 33.
117 Id. atparas. 138, 158.
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to interceptions made beyond Europe's borders.
During the decades in which its rulings expanded the geographical scope
of European human rights law, the European Human Rights Court also
developed an expansive jurisprudence concerning the circumstances under
which Article 3 requires non-refoulement protection for asylum seekers. For
example, the Court ruled that the Netherlands could not return an asylum
seeker to a "relatively safe" area of Somalia where there was a real risk that
the unstable situation would force her to move to unsafe areas of the
country. 118 Nor could the United Kingdom rely on national security grounds
to return a Sikh separatist accused of violence to India, when there was a
serious risk that he would face inhumane or degrading treatment or
punishment.' 19 Further, the Court held that Sweden could not return a rejected
asylum seeker to Afghanistan due to the inhumane or degrading treatment she
would confront based on her decision to divorce her Afghan husband while
they were living in Sweden. 120 Despite the lack of a right to asylum in the
European Human Rights Convention, the Court's rulings have protected many
asylum seekers and allowed them to remain in Europe.
As the EU common asylum laws gradually took effect during the first
decade of the twenty-first century, many disappointed asylum seekers
challenged aspects of the EU system by petitioning the European Human
Rights Court. At first, the European Human Rights Court was reluctant to
condemn the nascent EU asylum arrangements. Not only might the European
Human Rights Court have considered it wise to allow new structures time to
mature, but the EU court system had mechanisms to challenge its own laws.
Deference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 12 1 appeared
a wise course of action in 2009 when the CJEU issued the landmark Elgafaji
decision expanding asylum to a broader group of refugees than only those who
feared persecution. 122 Elgafaji v. Staatssecretarisvan Justitie ruled that EU
law furnished a judicially enforceable right to asylum in the EU to those who
fear serious harm, defined to include indiscriminate violence from armed
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Salah Sheekh v. Netherlands, App. No. 1948/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 143-149 (2007).

Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996).
N v. Sweden, App. No. 23505/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).
121 The Court of Justice of the European Union consists of one judge from each EU country,
plus 11 Advocates General. It issues binding interpretations of EU law that must be applied in
each EU country. Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), EUROPEAN UNION,
http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index-en.htm (last visited Oct. 25,
2016) [http://perma.cc/D68A-6N64].
122 Case C-465/07, Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 2009 E.C.R. 1-921..
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conflict. 12 3 The CJEU ruling provided greater protection than the European
Human Rights Court could have. The Elgafaji family had a right to a
renewable residence permit, 124 not simply a non-refoulement order that left
them in limbo. The CJEU had checked the government of the Netherlands
when it attempted to deny protection to the Elgafaji family, as the European
Human Rights Court had checked the government of Sweden when it denied
asylum to Cruz Varas.
Despite the positive developments in EU law, such as the Elgafaji
judgment, human rights challenges continued to mount against the negative
elements of the EU asylum system. Litigation challenging the pernicious
aspects of the Dublin Regulation grew apace, especially decisions by EU
countries to transfer asylum seekers to Greece where they had first entered the
EU. The petitioners acknowledged that according to the Dublin Regulation
criteria Greece was the EU state responsible for addressing the merits of the
asylum claim, 125 but they argued that the abysmal conditions in Greece
12 6
ensured that they would suffer cruel and inhumane conditions.
Accordingly, they asked the European Court of Human Rights to rule that their
transfers to Greece would violate human rights law. The European Human
Rights Court did not rush to rule on the EU Dublin regulation, but the Court
indicated it was wary of the Dublin transfers to Greece. During a four-month
period in 2008 the Court issued orders in eighty cases, provisionally staying
removals from the United Kingdom to Greece while the parties had further
27
time to develop their arguments before the Court. 1
Despite the large number of emergency stays of Dublin transfer orders,
as well as multiple negative reports on the human rights situation of asylum
seekers in Greece, 128 the European Court of Human Rights decided in 2009
that "the presumption must be that Greece will abide by its obligations under
[the EU asylum system].' 2 9 In this decision, KR.S. v. UnitedKingdom, the
Court also presumed that Greece would abide by the European Human Rights
Convention: "Greece, as a Contracting State, has undertaken to abide by its
Convention obligations and to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the
123 Id. at para. 43.

Qualification Directive, Art. 24.
Dublin HI Regulation, supranote 46, arts. 7, 13.
126 See, e.g., K.R.S. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 32733/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008).
127 Id. at paras. 3-4.
128 Id. at paras. 11-14 (referring to reports filed by Amnesty International, Norwegian
124
125

Helsinki Committee, Greek Helsinki Monitor, UNHCR, the Committee against Torture, and

others).
129 Id. atparas. 17-18.
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rights
and freedoms defined therein, including those guaranteed by Article
3. " 130 In light of these presumptions, the European Court of Human Rights
refused to rule that Dublin Regulation transfers of asylum seekers to Greece
violated human rights.
The reprieve for the Dublin Regulation was short-lived, however.
Conditions for asylum seekers in Greece did not improve, and UNHCR
131
continued to call on EU governments to halt Dublin transfers to Greece.
Two years later, in 2011, the European Court of Human Rights did an about132
face and issued the momentous MS.S. v. Belgium and Greece judgment,
ruling that Belgium's reliance on the EU Dublin Regulation to return an
asylum seeker to Greece violated the prohibition against cruel and inhumane
treatment. 133 Notwithstanding the presumptions that Greece would uphold
human rights and European asylum law, the Court could tolerate the abuses
no longer. The Court noted that the EU law greatly burdened states on the
external borders of the EU, like Greece, 134 but it emphasized the absolute
non-refoulement prohibition of Article 3.135 After detailing the shocking and
inhumane conditions awaiting asylum seekers in Greece--detention in
overwhelmingly crowded and unhygienic conditions, 136 living on the streets
for months at a time with ever-present fear of attack or robbery, 137 the
practical inability to receive an asylum hearing, 138 the infinitesimal chance of
a favorable result 139-the Court concluded that both Greece and Belgium had
committed multiple violations of Article 3 and other European human rights
provisions. 140 Tellingly, the Court assessed higher damages against
Belgium,
14 1
which had transferred Mr. M.S.S. to Greece, than against Greece.
The MS.S. decision sent shockwaves through the EU, as a sister
institution had publicly condemned the deplorable asylum system in Greece.
Since many EU states were poised to rely on the Dublin Regulation to transfer
130

Id.
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asylum seekers back to Greece, the MS.S. judgment upended their plans.
More fundamentally, however, the European Court of Human Rights had sat
in judgment on EU legislation, and had publicly proclaimed that it violated
human rights.
The immediate aftermath was three-fold. First, EU states stopped
transferring asylum seekers to Greece. Second, within several months the
CJEU echoed the European Court of Justice. The CJEU ruled in N.S. v.
Secretary ofStatefor the Home Departmentthat neither Ireland nor the United
Kingdom could transfer asylum seekers back to Greece under the Dublin
Regulation. 14 2 Third, asylum seekers threatened by transfer to other EU states
with unacceptable conditions relied on MS.S. to challenge their transfers.
When state officials rejected their challenges to the Dublin transfer system,
individual asylum seekers began litigating these rejections in national courts
systems. 143 Judges in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and other EU states
recognized that they were bound both by EU asylum law and by European
human rights law. 144 A small but steady number of jurists
relied on M.S.S. to
45
block Dublin transfers to Hungary, Bulgaria, and Italy. 1
In light of the M.S.S. judgment, the European Human Rights Court
continued to receive petitions challenging Dublin Regulation transfers to other
countries. Multiple individuals protested transfers to Italy, another EU border
state reeling with large numbers of asylum seekers. In 2013, the European
Court rejected three major attacks on Dublin transfers to Italy, each time
emphasizing that, in contrast to the situation in Greece, the Italian asylum
system was still functioning, despite the defects in accommodations provided
14 6
to asylum seekers.
By 2014, three years after the MS.S. judgment, the European Court of
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Human Rights was dissatisfied with the lack of improvement in the situation
for asylum seekers in Italy. In Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, the
Court ruled that Italian border authorities on the Adriatic Sea frequently
violated Article 3 when ferry boats arrived from Greece. 147 When Italian
authorities found undocumented individuals on the boats, they immediately
placed them in the custody of the ferry boat captains who returned them to
Greece without a hearing in Italy. 148 The Court condemned this practice as a
human rights violation, warning that it exposed
individuals to the risk of
49
refoulement from Greece to Afghanistan. 1
More significantly, the European Human Rights Court ruled for a second
time that EU asylum legislation violated the prohibition against cruel and
inhumane treatment. In Tarakhel v. Switzerland and Italy, 150 the Court
prohibited Switzerland from relying on the Dublin Regulation to transfer an
Afghan family to Italy. 151 Tarakhel clarified that the inhumanity of Dublin
transfers was not confined to cases involving the dismal and desperate
Rather, the European Human Rights Court
conditions in Greece.
reemphasized that EU asylum law can (and has) run afoul of European human
rights law. As a consequence, EU states can no longer simply apply EU
asylum legislation. Instead, they must examine the common asylum laws
through the prism of the prohibition against cruel and inhumane treatment to
determine whether their application may result in a violation. Tarakhel has
conclusively ended the automatic legitimacy accorded to EU law.
As a practical matter, the Tarakhel judgment has also had other farreaching consequences: it has raised the human rights floor. As in MS.S., the
European Human Rights Court maintains focus on the systemic failures of a
state's asylum law; but Tarakhel also ensures that states with functioning,
though seriously impaired, asylum centers and procedures will not escape
human rights scrutiny. Despite acknowledging that "the situation in Italy can
in no way be compared to the situation in Greece at the time of the M.S.S
judgment,"'152 the Court still condemned the Italian treatment of asylum
seekers.
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Furthermore, the Tarakhel judgment signals a special concern for the
human rights vulnerabilities of child asylum seekers. A major element of the
Tarakhel reasoning was the absence of suitable accommodations in Italy for
asylum seekers like the Tarakhel parents and their six minor children. 153 In
light of the large numbers of young asylum seekers and the growing flow of
unaccompanied youth, the Court's sensitivity to special vulnerabilities and its
insistence that human rights law requires an individualized examination of an
asylum seeker's circumstances are important bench marks in the ongoing
development of European human rights law.
CONCLUSION

At this point, the future of asylum in Europe looks opaque: the British
have voted to leave the EU; some of the formerly Communist EU countries
continue to protest the relocation of refugees; and the fate of the March 2016
EU-Turkey refugee agreement is questionable, both in terms of its human
rights implications and its practical effect. The European Court of Human
Rights, however, has been a constant and vigorous defender of the rights of
individuals by creating substantial protections for asylum seekers in Europe.
Under the Court's vision, European human rights law has more resolutely
protected refugees than European asylum law. As its jurisprudence
interpreting the prohibition against inhumane and degrading treatment has
developed and deepened, the European Court of Human Rights has ensured
that asylum seekers in Europe cannot be deported to states where there is a
real risk of cruel or inhumane treatment or punishment. With the EU common
asylum system in disarray, the European Human Rights Court has stepped in
to ensure that the human rights of asylum seekers are protected. European
human rights law has assumed primacy in protecting refugees in Europe.
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